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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KATHE C HOMER,
Plaintiff-Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs
Court of Appeals
Case No. 20000008-CA

STEPHEN G HOMER,
Defendant-Appellant

DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff-Appellee is Kathe C Homer, a natural
person. The Defendant-Appellant is Stephen G Homer, a
natural person. The parties are former spouses to each
other, having been divorced in 1989.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to
the provision of Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code
[appeals

from

district

court

involving

domestic

relations].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This "appeal" is NOT the garden-variety "divorce
case". This "appeal" presents issues of "constitutional
dimension" involving "denial of equal protection of the
law"

and

the

"uniform

operation

of

the

law", in

contradiction to the state and national constitutions.
This appeal presents the following issues for
review:
1.

Whether the constitutional principles of

"equal protection of the law" and "uniform
operation

of

laws"

are

violated

by

the

interpretation and application of specific
provisions of 30-3-5(h), Utah Code [providing
that "lifetime" alimony may not be awarded in
"short

term"

provisions

of

marriages]

and

Section

30-3-5,

the

general

Utah

Code

[providing for award of alimony in general] if
applied only in divorce cases filed after the
effective date of such new legislation.
2.

Whether

the

trial
A

court

properly

interpreted

and

applied

the

relevant

constitutional provisions in dismissing the
petition to modify the decree of divorce.
The interpretation and application of provisions
of the state and national constitutions as well as Utah
statute by the trial court are matters of law. The
trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are
reviewed

for

correctness.

United

Park

City

Mines

Company vs Greater Park City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Society of Separationists,
Inc.

vs Taggart,

862 P.2d 1339, 1341

(Utah Supreme

Court 1993) .
This standard of review has also been referred to
as

a

"correction

of

error

standard".

Jacobsen

Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P. 2d
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992);
838

P.2d

1134,

"Correction
deference

of

1135
error"

(Utah
means

Sanders vs Ovard,

Supreme
that

Court
no

1992).

particular

is given to the trial court's

questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P.2d

ruling on
932, 936

(Utah Supreme Court 19 94); Provo River Water Users'
Association vs Morgan, 857 P. 2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme
Court 1993) . The "correction of error" standard means
that the appellate court decides the matter for itself
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's

5

determination of law. State vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Howell vs Howell, 806 P.2d
1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petition for Modification alleges and presents
the following material facts, implicitly admitted by
the Respondent (wife) in the Motion to Dismiss:
1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married

in August 1980.
2.

In September 1987 the Plaintiff filed

this action for divorce, seeking an absolute
divorce

upon

grounds

of

"irreconcilable

differences", and obtained a restraining order
requiring the Defendant-Petitioner to leave
permanently the marital residence.
3.

In October

1989

the Court

entered a

Decree of Divorce, granting to the Plaintiff
the absolute divorce requested and ordered the
Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff $150.00 per
month in alimony.
4.

Beginning in August 1989 and continuously

each month thereafter the Defendant has paid
$150.00 per month alimony to the Plaintiff.
5.

The 1995 Utah Legislature passed into law

House Bill No. 36, enacting new provisions

codified

at Subsection 30-3-5 (6) (h) , Utah

Code, to provide:
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for
a duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court
finds extenuating circumstances that
justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.
1995 Laws of Utah, Chapter 330.
6.

There

were

and

are

no

extenuating

circumstances which justify the continuing and
future payment of alimony.
[See Petition to Modify, attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.]
The

wife's

"motion

district court

to

dismiss"

granted

by

the

admits the truth of the allegations of

the Petition. When considering a dismissal based on
Rule 12, the court must accept the material allegations
of the complaint as true, Petersen vs Jones, 16 Utah 2d
121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (Utah 1964).

Colman vs

State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
In 1995 the Legislature adopted House Bill 36,
entitled

"Revision

of

Alimony

Standards",

making

significant changes in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code. The
portion of the 1995 legislation
as "the new statute"

characterized herein

applicable to this appeal is

contained in subsections (g) [prohibiting modifications
of alimony awards except in cases of
7

"extenuating

circumstances"] and (h) [expressly denying to the trial
court any power to order lifetime alimony] . When these
two provisions are coupled with the alimony provisions
found generally in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code, the
legislative creation of a "classification" is evident.
On 29 October 1999 the District Court heard oral
arguments concerning the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss;
no sworn evidence was received. On 29 November 1999 the
District Court entered an order [EXHIBIT #3, hereto]
dismissing the Petition to Modify. This appeal was
thereafter perfected.
ARGUMENT
THE NEW STATUTE VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
OF EQUAL PROTECTION, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND
THE OPEN COURTS PROVISIONS
A
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
[Section 1] . . . nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Emphasis added.
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution
provides:
"All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation."
Q

Article

I,

Section

11, of

the Utah

Constitution

provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.
B
THE NEW DIVORCE STATUTE
This case and this appeal is not focused upon
whether or not the new statute [i.e. Section 3 0-3-5(h),
Utah Code] is "procedural" or "substantive" or whether
it

should

be

applied

"retroactively"

or

only

"prospectively" . The case is about whether or not
Section

30-3-5(h)

and

its

companion

statutory

provisions sets up an unconstitutional classification.
When coupled with the new provisions codified at
30-3-5(g), Utah Code
of House Bill 36

simultaneously adopted as part

the overall statute has the effect

of creating two "classifications" under the law: those
divorced under the "old" (i.e. pre-1995 statute) and
those persons divorced under the "new"

(i.e. 1995

statutory amendments) statute.
That

the

divorce

statute

sets

up

such

a

classification is clear from a close reading of House

9

Bill

36. As

is

facially

obvious,

subsection

(h)

precludes the court from awarding "lifetime" alimony,
except

in

"extraordinary

circumstances".

[If

the

statute is applied "prospectively" only, then paying
spouses under

"old" divorces are obligated to pay

"lifetime" alimony, whereas similarly-situated persons
under the "new" (i.e. post-1995) divorce law are not so
obligated.]
Under

the

provisions

of

subsection

analysis AND EFFECT is almost
alimony-receiving

persons

generally)

"old"

precluded,

under
except

circumstances"

from

in

flip-flopped. Those

(i.e.

divorces
cases

seeking

(g) , the

former
are

of
and

wives,

statutorily

"extraordinary
obtaining

a

modification of the decree increasing or extending
alimony; it is as if the Legislature has envisioned and
is

attempting

to

curtain

the

"intellectual

gamesmanship" reflected in the Wilde vs Wilde decision,
969 P.2d 438 (Utah Court of Appeals 1998).
This situation can best be illustrated with a
hypothetical example
extreme

perhaps almost silly in the

but it illustrates the principle.

Assume, for example, that two "twin" males
separately marry "twin" sisters, on the same
date. The two couples have the exact same
marriages: same earnings, same number of
children, same incomes, same everything
as
ridiculously "same" as we can legally assume

things to have been in our contrived
hypothetical. Seven years later, the twin
sisters decide to file for divorce from their
husbands. They go to the Clerk's Office of the
District Court, where they wait in line. Their
actions are taken at the end of the business
day on the last day before the effective date
of the new statute (circa 1 May 1995) . The one
"twin" is allowed to file, while the other
twin is told to come back in the morning. She
does so, and files AFTER the "new" statute
(i.e. no permanent alimony) is in effect. The
two cases proceed on the litigation track.
They are assigned to the same judge. Because
the two marriages are so absolutely "equal",
the actual trial of the two divorce cases is
consolidated. The later-filed case
the
divorce filed AFTER the effective date of the
new statute
is granted first. In that
situation, the husband of that divorce is
obligated to pay alimony for a period not
longer than the marriage lasted (i.e. 7
years) . However, his legal "twin" (in the
hypothetical) is, because of the filing under
the "old" statute, exposed to the possibility
of "lifetime" alimony, merely because his
former spouse was standing in line in the
Clerks's office in front of the other spouse.
One might say that the "hypothetical" example is
extreme; perhaps so, but it illustrates the point.
The Court of Appeals decision in Wilde vs Wilde,
969 P.2d 438 (Utah Court of Appeals 1998), is directly
to that effect. [Why is "alimony" so jurisprudentially
unique that a judgment regarding alimony is so fraught
with

intellectual

dishonesty?

What

other

kind of

financial obligation, reduced to judgment, would be
judicially increased

per Wilde

merely because the

judgment of the court was not promptly paid? Why do
courts

engage

in

such

substantively-insignificant
ii

sophistries to award

(or extend) alimony, and yet

ignore the substantive legal effect of the underlying
legislation obviously intended to terminate an award of
"lifetime"

alimony?

understood,

is

Indeed, Wilde,

authority

for

the

when
trial

carefully
court

to

properly terminate a previous award of alimony, under
the

"new"

statute,

whether

that

statute

is

characterized as "retroactive" or not!]
The only distinguishing feature between the two
divorces is whether one is approached
(h) purposes

for subsection

under the "old" statute or under the

"new" statute. Yet the effect upon the parties is
tremendous.
It is difficult to envision a more "real life"
example

which doesn't

intellectual

and

carry with

jurisprudential

alimony carries with it

it all of the
"baggage"

which

which illustrates this point.

An example might be the following: if the Legislature
passed a statute which gave all "new" drivers their
driver's license at not charge, whereas those who had
already been granted driver's licenses had to continue
to pay, even upon renewal. Surely such an invidiously
discriminatory statutory scheme would not be allowed to
stand.
If, as the wife now argues, the "new" statute is

procedural

and

should

be

applied

only

to

"new"

divorces, the husband in the later filed divorce will
only have to pay alimony for ONLY seven years, whereas
the other husband may have to pay alimony

for a

lifetime, merely because his former spouse filed under
the "old" statute.
C
CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION
The

foregoing

constitutional

provisions have,

independently and/or in conjunction with one another,
been utilized to invalidate a number of statutes. See,
for example, Berry vs Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717
P.2d

670

(Utah

Supreme

Court

1986)

[limitations

provisions of Utah Product Liability Act]; Sun Valley
Water Beds of Utah, Incorporated vs Herm Hughes & Son,
782 P.d 188 (Utah Supreme Court 1989) [architect's and
builder's statute of repose]; Horton vs Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P. 2d 1087

(Utah Supreme Court 1989)

[former architect's and builder's statute of repose].
Malan vs Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 1984)
[automobile guest statute unconstitutional]; Johnston
vs Stoker, 685 P.2d 539

(Utah Supreme Court 1984)

[aircraft guest statute unconstitutional] ; State Tax
Commission vs Department of Finance, Utah, 576 P. 2d
1297

(Utah

Supreme

Court

17

1978)

[statute

unconstitutional

because

it singled out the state

insurance fund from all insurance companies that were
found to be within the same class to pay a special
tax]; Dodge Town Inc. vs Romney, 480 P.2d 461 (Utah
Supreme Court 1971) [Sunday closing law that required
only licensed automobile dealers to close and permitted
other

businesses

to

transact

business

on

Sunday

unconstitutional because the discrimination failed to
further the legislative purpose of preventing fraud and
auto thefts] ; Broadbent vs Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 69, 140
P.2d

939, 946

(1943)

unconstitutional
exceptions

to

[general Sunday

because

the

the

general

statute

rule

closing
had

that

law

so many

the

statute

actually constituted "a grant of a special privilege to
the excepted classes" without a legal excuse for not
granting the same privilege to others] ; Skaggs Drug
Centers, Inc. vs

Ashley, 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d 723

(1971) [large number of exceptions to the statute in
question

casts

substantial

doubt

on

what

the

Legislature actually intended].
Malan vs Lewis, supra, held that Article I, Section
24 requires that a law must apply equally to all
persons

within

a

class

and

that

statutory

classifications must have a "reasonable tendency to
further the objectives of the statute." 6 93 P.2d at

670. In this regard, the objectives of the statute are
ambiguous, at best. On the one hand, the Legislature
has clearly stated

in subsection (h)

alimony" is, in most cases
"extenuating

(except in cases where

circumstances" are found) , not to be

awarded. That applies
subsection

that "lifetime

(g)

to the

prohibits,

"new" divorces. But

except

in

"extenuating

circumstances" cases going exactly the opposite way,
the reopening of any divorce cases for the purposes of
modifying alimony.
The Legislature cannot create two classifications
of persons and deny to the one class the rights (i.e.
to not have to pay "lifetime" alimony), merely based
upon the filing date of the divorce!
What are the "reasonable objectives of the statute"
when the statute prohibits (in most cases) the award of
lifetime alimony, while simultaneously mandating that
those similarly-situated persons from "old" divorces
are obligated to pay a permanent alimony? It cannot be
said (or assumed) that the Legislature was concerned
about the minimal burden upon the courts; the courts
have always had "continuing jurisdiction" to entertain
modification orders. See, also, Reed vs Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) [Idaho statute preferring males over equallyqualified females for appointment as administrators of

1 C

intestate estates violates Equal Protection Clause of
14th Amendment].
The new statute represents a significant change in
the legal

environment

in which

alimony

is to be

approached. This change in "the law of alimony" IS
BINDING upon the Court and upon the parties hereto.
The trial court's "jurisdiction" (i.e. the power
to order alimony in divorce cases) arises from statute,
not from the inherent power of the court. Thus, the
Court

must

follow

those

pronouncements

of

the

Legislature, as embodied in the statute.
To do otherwise (i.e. to apply the statute only in
cases of "new" divorces while ignoring the statute and
its provision in "old" divorces, although recently
brought

before

modification"

the

Court

in

"petitions

such as this one) invokes

for

the very

"constitutional" issues identified in Paragraph 8 of
the Petition: that the effect of the so-called "no
retroactivity"

argument

(as

anticipated

by

the

Petitioner) creates two "classes" of persons under the
law: (1) those persons who must pay alimony because
there divorce was granted BEFORE the 1995 effective
date of the statute and (2) those persons who obtain a
divorce AFTER the 1995 effective date of the statute.
In Liedtke vs Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982),

the Utah Supreme Court stated that Article I, §24 is
"generally considered the equivalent of the Equal
Protection

Clause

of

the

14th

Amendment,

U.S.

Constitution." 649 P.2d at 81 n.l. Although their
language is dissimilar, Article I, §24 and the Equal
Protection Clause embody the same general principle:
persons similarly situated should be treated similarly,
and persons in different circumstances should not be
treated as if their circumstances were the same. See
Baker vs Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979) ; McLaughlin
vs Florida, 379 US 184 (1964) .
The question thus is posed: does the "divorce law"
(i.e.

Section

30-3-5,

Utah

Code),

under

which

"lifetime" alimony is (or has been) awarded PERMANENTLY
in pre-1995 divorces (the "old" divorces) have "uniform
operation" when men

which is almost universally the

case, which raises its own set of "unconstitutional"
discrimination issues
divorces

who are parties to post-1995

(the "new" divorces) do not have to pay

permanent (i.e. non-terminating) alimony, by reason of
the application of the 1995 amendment to the statute?
If the "no retroactive application" interpretation of
the statute advanced by the Respondent is followed, the
statute facially DOES NOT have "uniform operation" nor
does it provide for the

-i n

"equal protection" as is

constitutionally required.
In Malan vs Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court
1984), the Utah Supreme Court
"automobile
articulated

guest
the

statute"

purposes

and

invalidating the Utah
illuminated
application

and
of

the

"uniform operation of laws" and the "equal protection"
provisions of the constitutions. The Court wrote:
Whether a statute meets equal protection
standards depends in the first instance upon
the objectives of the statute and whether the
classifications
established
provide
a
reasonable
basis
for
promoting
those
objectives.

Article 1, §24 protects against two types
of discrimination. First, a law must apply
equally to all persons within a class.
Second, the statutory classifications and the
different treatment given the classes must be
based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the
statute.
If
the
relationship
of
the
classification to the statutory objectives is
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination
is unreasonable. Equal protection of the law,
;•;.••>.'•.; both state and federal, "requires more of a
state law than nondiscriminatory application
within the class it establishes . " The
classification must rest upon some difference
which "'bears a reasonable and just relation
to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed, and can never be
made arbitrarily and without any such basis .
[A]rbitrary selection can never be
justified by calling it classification." "The
Courts must reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn in a statute
are reasonable in light of its purpose. The
law under Article I, §24 is not different.
693 P.2d at 670-72. Emphasis added. Citations to cases
1 O

and footnotes omitted.
The claimed "legislative classification"

i.e.

that former spouses under the "old" divorces must
continue to pay lifetime

(non-terminating) alimony

while former spouses obtaining

"new" divorces are

entitled to terminating alimony, if any
the

"no

retroactive

application"

arising from
interpretation

advanced by the Respondent and followed by the District
Court:
1.

DOES NOT ". . .provide a reasonable basis

for promoting those objectives;
2.

IS NOT " . . . based on differences that

have a reasonable tendency to further the
objectives of the statute . . ."; AND
3.

DOES NOT "[bear] a reasonable and just

relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed. . ."
See Malan vs Lewis, supra. The clear legislative intent
is to PROHIBIT awards of "lifetime" alimony!
Although alimony has, over time, been seemingly
explained and seemingly justified on a number of bases
over the centuries, those "historic" arguments for the
continuation of lifetime alimony are now made "moot" by
the legislative action embodied in Section 30-5-6(h),
Utah Code. The statute reflects the present policy of

1 Q

the state: that lifetime alimony is not to be awarded
or required, except in "extenuating circumstances"
(which Respondent herein has admitted DO NOT EXIST).
With the state's "policy" (regarding the prohibition of
"lifetime alimony") now clearly before us.
Given the fact that the Legislature has now, as a
matter of public policy, mandated that "(permanent)
alimony may not be awarded") , all of the "historic" and
legalistic arguments for continuing the practice of
economic

bondage

by

which

a

former

spouse

is

financially bound to another must fail. It is clear
that the Legislature has said: "NO MORE permanent
(lifetime) alimony!"
To continue to advance an interpretation of the
statute so as to circumvent the clear legislative
intent behind Section 30-5-6(h) is unconscionable and
contrary

to

the

Court's

obligation

to

"obey

the

Constitution" and "uphold the law", particularly when
the effective result of the Court's interpretation is
to create the very unconstitutional "classification"
complained of.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
For a law to be constitutional under Article
I, section 24, it is not enough that it be
uniform on its face. What is critical is that
the operation of the law be uniform. A law
does not operate uniformly if "persons
similarly situated are not "treated similarly"

or if "persons in different circumstances" are
"treated as if their circumstances were the
same."
Malan vs Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 669

(Utah 1984).

Emphasis added. That some former spouses must pay
"lifetime" alimony while some do not

adjudicated

merely upon the filing date of the divorce action

is

not the "uniform operation" the constitution requires!
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance,
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Equal
protection
protects
against
discrimination within a class. The legislature
has considerable discretion in the designation
of classifications but the court must
determine whether such classifications operate
equally on all persons similarly situated.
Thus, whether a classification operates
uniformly on all persons situated within
constitutional parameters is an issue that
must ultimately be decided by the judiciary.
576 P.2d 1297 at 1298 (Utah 1978). Emphasis added.
Similarly, the legislative denial of rights to
those persons paying "lifetime" alimony under the "old"
statute similarly offends the "open courts" provision
[Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution).
CONCLUSION
The

"classification"

(and

its

resultant

discrimination) cannot be condoned, especially in light
of

the

legislative

pronouncement

that

"lifetime"

alimony is no longer to be awarded.
There is no legal or factual justification for
o-i

imposing upon one class of persons

(those divorced

under the pre-1995 ("old") statute) the obligation of
"lifetime" alimony and the economic peonage it entails
while simultaneously excusing those similarly-situated
persons divorced under the post-1995 ("new") statute
from paying "lifetime" alimony, solely because of the
court's refusal to find "retroactive" application to
that statute!
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of May, 2000.

Attorney Pro Se
Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be hand-delivered to the office
of Ms Helen E Christian, Attorney at Law, Gustin,
Christian, Skordas & Caston, Boston Building, Suite
#810, #9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this 31st day of May, 2000.
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ADDENDA
EXHIBIT 1: PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE
EXHIBIT 2: MOTION TO DISMISS
EXHIBIT 3: DISTRICT COURT MEMORANDUM DECISION

^

STEPHEN G HOMER (153 6)
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone (801) 561-9665
Defendant-Petitioner Pro Se

L v

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHE C HOMER,
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs
STEPHEN G HOMER,

Civil No. 87-2098

Defendant-Petitioner

Case assigned to Judge Harding

The Defendant-Petitioner STEPHEN G HOMER hereby petitions the
Court for a modification of the Decree of Divorce, entered October
1989, in the above-entitled action.
This Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is based
upon the following grounds*.
1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in August

1980.
2.

In September 1987 the Plaintiff filed this action

for divorce, seeking an absolute divorce upon grounds of
"irreconcilable differences", and obtained a restraining
order

requiring

the

Defendant-Petitioner

to

leave

permanently the marital residence.
3.

In October

1989 the Court entered a Decree of

EXHIBIT 1

m

Divorce, granting to the Plaintiff the absolute divorce
requested

and

ordered

the

Defendant

to

pay

to

the

Plaintiff $150.00 per month in alimony.
4.

Beginning in August 1989 and continuously each month

thereafter

the

Defendant

has

paid

$150.00

per

month

alimony to the Plaintiff.
5.

Subsection 30-3-5 (6) (h) , Utah Code, provides:
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination
of alimony,
the court
finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of
time.

6.

There

which

were

justify

and
the

are

no

extenuating

continuing

and

circumstances

future

payment

of

alimony.
7.

The Defendant-Petitioner

modifying

the

Decree

of

is entitled

Divorce,

to an Order

permanently

and

irrevocably terminating the requirement that alimony be
paid.
8.

Continued requirement of alimony, in any amount, in

this

case

deprives

constitutional
Protection
United

rights

Clause

States

of

the

Defendant-Petitioner

guaranteed

him under

the

the Fourteenth Amendment

Constitution

and

under

of

the

the
Equal

to the
uniform

operation of laws clause of Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution.

2
STEPHEN G HOMER

WHEREFORE, Defendant: - Pet i l ioner prays for: the following relief
1.
of

That the Court enter an Order, modifying the Decree
Divorce

previously-entered

and

permanently

and

irrevocably terminal ing the requ i teiuent that alimony be
paid to the Plaintiff;
2.

That

Defendant

Lhe

Court

tuL iliuiici

award
lor

judgment

his

in

at I. e> J no y ' s

favor
LeeS

of
and

the
costs

incurred in bringing and prosecuting this Petition; and
3.

That the Court award such other relief as is just.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 1999.

%j^^^
De tt/hdant - Petitioner Pro Se
Plaint iff' s address:
KATHE C HOMER
1015 East 50 0 North
Orem, Utah 84 0 97
Defendant' s address:
STEPHEN G HOMER
92 2 5 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84 088

STEPHkN G iiGMLH

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Petitioner
Suite 722, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-oooOooo-

KATHE C. HOMER,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Petitioner,
v.
STEPHEN G. HOMER,

Civil No. 87-2098

Respondent.

Judge Ray Harding, Jr.
-oooOooo

Petitioner, KATHE C. HOMER, by and through her counsel, Helen E. Christian, moves
the Court to dismiss the Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed by Respondent on
the following reasons and grounds set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed contemporaneously with this Motion.
DATED this _C_ day of August, 1999.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Petitioner

EXHIBIT 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _\o_ day of August, 1999, I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to:

Stephen G. Homer
9225 South Redwood Road
Wesi Jordan, UT 84088

Kristine Wimmer Berg
homei.mol
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHE C. HOMER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING
Case No. 87-2098

STEPHEN G. HOMER,

Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

Defendant.
I

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree
of Divorce. The Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following:
RULING
The parties to this action were married in August, 1980. Their Decree of Divorce was
entered October 26, 1989. It provides that "[t]he Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum
of $150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly payments on the 5th and 20th of
each month commencing July, 1989." The Defendant has paid $150.00 in alimony each
month since August 1989.
At the time the parties' Decree was entered the Utah Code provided that alimony would
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient former spouse or upon a showing
that the recipient former spouse was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(5) & (6) (1991). In 1995 the Legislature amended the statute to provide t M
u

[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the

EXHIBIT 3

marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
The Defendant contends that subsection (7)(h) applies to this action and requires this
Court to modify the Decree by permanently and irrevocably terminating the requirement that
he pay alimony. He reasons that he was only married for nine years and two months (from
August 1980 to October 1989), and yet he has paid alimony for ten years and two months
(from August 1989 to October 1999), which is longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed. He also argues that there were and are no extenuating circumstances
justifying the payment of alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage, as
now required by the statute. Therefore, he reasons that the requirement that he continue to
pay alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage violates subsection (7)(h).
The Plaintiff responds with the argument that subsection (7)(h) does not apply to this
action because it cannot be retroactively applied. However, subsection (7)(h) clearly applies to
this action. It is undisputed that "the substantive law to be applied throughout an action is the
law in effect at the date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). For example, in Wilde, the defendant filed a petition in August 1994 seeking
to modify the divorce decree to provide for additional alimony. IcL at 441. In January 1996
the defendant filed an amended petition to modify. IcL Between the filing of the original and
amended petitions, the 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 took effect. IcL One effect of the 1995
amendments was to add subsection (7)(g)(ii) conditioning a modification of alimony for the
recipient spouse only upon a showing of extenuating circumstances. IcL This raised the issue
of whether the court should apply the 1994 version or the amended 1995 version of § 30-3-5 to
Ruling Page 2

the petition to modify. The Utah Court of Appeals held that because the action commenced
with the filing of the original petition, and because subsection (7)(g)(ii) was a substantive
change that could not be applied retroactively, the 1994 version of the statute applied to the
petition to modify. IcL at 443.
In the instant case there is no issue as to whether subsection (7)(h) applies retroactively
because subsection (7)(h) was in effect at the time this action was filed. The instant action was
initiated on July 21, 1999, when the Defendant filed his Petition for Modification. Because
subsection (7)(h), enacted in 1995, was in effect at the date this action was initiated, it anplies
to this action regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive change in the law.
However, even though subsection (7)(h) applies to this action it is not dispositive of the
issues raised in Defendant's Petition to Modify. The Defendant would have this Court
interpret subsection (7)(h) to require that this Court must terminate any award of alimony
entered prior to the 1995 amendment that extends beyond the number of years that the
/

marriage existed, unless the recipient spouse can show the "extenuating circumstances" that the
statute requires. The Court disagrees. Neither the language of the statute itself, nor the
legislative intent behind the statute provide for such a result.
The statute states, "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of
time." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). It is clear from the language of
the statute itself that subsection (7)(h) merely limits the equitable powers of the courts in
awarding alimony. It is not a command to courts to terminate previously entered alimony
awards that extend beyond the duration of the marriage. The Legislature does not have the
Ruling Page 3

power to require a court to reopen its prior orders, or to dictate the outcome of a case. Such a
result would violate separation of powers principles. Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. Furthermore,
the legislative intent, evident from the entire statutory scheme governing alimony, provides
that an alimony award can only be terminated or modified upon a showing of a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998). The purpose of subsection (7)(h) was not to terminate previously
entered alimony awards, but simply to limit the equitable powers of the courts when entering
orders awarding alimony. Therefore., subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the
Divorce Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Petition for Modification should be dismissed
/

because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe
the complaint, or in this case the Petition, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge
all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055
(Utah 1991), Defendant's only grounds for modification of the Divorce Decree is that this
Court should terminate the alimony award under subsection (7)(h). For the reasons set forth
above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce Decree and terminate
Plaintiffs alimony award. Rather, this Court may only modify an alimony award upon a
showing of "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Because the Defendant has failed to allege any
facts which would show a substantial material change in circumstances his Petition fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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The Defendant argues that if subsection (7)(h) does not require this Court to terminate
the alimony award, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution as well as Art. 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution which states
that "[ajll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Defendant reasons that
applying subsection (7)(h) in divorces brought after 1995, while ignoring the statute in pre1995 divorces brought before the Court on petitions to modify creates two classes of persons
under the law: (1) those persons who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced
prior to the statute; and (2) those persons who only have to pay alimony for <he number of
years the marriage existed, absent a showing of extenuating circumstances. However, the
Court finds that subsection (7)(h) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform
Operation of Law Clause because it does not create any type of classification.
The protections contained in the Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Law
Clauses apply whenever the government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and treat
them differently. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Subsection (7)(h) does
not violate these principles however, because it does not create any type of classification, or
treat one group any different than another. Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive
law regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the courts in awarding alimony for
a period longer than the marriage existed.
Furthermore, the Defendant is not now treated any differently under subsection (7)(h)
than he was when his Decree was entered. The standard that the Defendant must meet in order
to modify the amount he must pay in alimony is the same now as it was when his Decree was
entered. In 1989 the standard for obtaining a modification of alimony required the movant to
"show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was not originally
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contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). This is precisely the same standard that the Defendant must meet today, as codified in
Uan Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not create different
classifications of individuals, or treat the Defendant any different than other similarly situated
individuals who are ordered to pay alimony. The standard to modify alimony has always been
the same, the only thing that has changed is that the Legislature has limited the equitable
power of the courts in awarding alimony to extend beyond the number of years that the
marriage existed. Accordingly, subsection (7)(h) is not unconstitutional unrlor either the 14,h
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 24 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
/

The Defendant also asserts that if subsection (7)(h) is not applied to terminate his
obligation to pay alimony this may violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the
"open courts" provision). However, he does not offer any analysis or explanation as to why
the statute would violate this provision. The provision states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11.
As discussed above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce
Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award. Such a finding, however, does not bar
Defendant from access to the courts or to a remedy. Rather, Defendant can petition this Court
for a modification of his Divorce Decree upon a showing of "a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i).
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Therefore, subsection (7)(h) as applied in the instant case does not violate Article I Section 11
of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby rules as follows:
1.

Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is DISMISSED.

2.

Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this

ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
Court fur signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.

DATED this A ^ / d a y of-Qetober, 1999.

X , ,,
/ R A Y M . HARDING, JR., JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
T hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage
prepaid tnereon this /

day of November, 1999, to the following:

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088
Helen E. Christian
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON
Suite 810 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
/
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Christopher D. Ballard
Law Clerk

